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In October 2022, when Rishi Sunak took over as the UK's leader, he was the fifth British prime minister to take up the role in six years.

Triggered in the UK by Britain's EU exit, this signified exceptional governmental instability. So what term captures what is unfolding in France, now on its fifth prime minister in two years – three of them in the last ten months?

The current premier, the recently reappointed Sébastien Lecornu, may have secured a temporary reprieve on that day, sacrificing Emmanuel Macron’s flagship pensions overhaul in exchange for opposition Socialist votes as the cost of his government’s survival.

But it is, at best, a temporary fix. The EU’s number two economic power is trapped in a political permacrisis, the scale of which it has not witnessed for many years – possibly not since the establishment of its Fifth French Republic in 1958 – and from which there seems no simple way out.

Governing Without a Majority

Essential context: ever since Macron called an ill-advised snap general election in 2024, the nation has had a hung parliament split into three opposing factions – left, the far right and his own centrist coalition – without any group holding a clear majority.

Simultaneously, the country faces dual debt and deficit crises: its debt-to-GDP ratio and deficit are now almost twice the EU limit, and hard constitutional deadlines to approve a 2026 budget that at least begins to rein in spending are nigh.

In this challenging environment, both Lecornu’s immediate predecessors – Michel Barnier, who lasted from September to December 2024, and François Bayrou, who took office from December 2024 to September 2025 – were ousted by the assembly.

In mid-September, the leader named his close ally Lecornu as his new prime minister. But when, just over a fortnight later, Lecornu presented his government team – which proved to be much the same as the old one – he faced fury from both supporters and rivals.

So much so that the following day, he resigned. After only 27 days as premier, Lecornu became the briefest-serving prime minister in modern French history. In a dignified speech, he cited political rigidity, saying “party loyalties” and “personal ambitions” would make his job all but impossible.

A further unexpected development: shortly after Lecornu’s resignation, Macron asked him to stay on for two more days in a last-ditch effort to secure multi-party support – a task, to put it mildly, filled with challenges.

Next, two of Macron’s former PMs publicly turned on the struggling leader. Meanwhile, the far-right National Rally (RN) and radical left France Unbowed (LFI) declined to engage with Lecornu, vowing to reject all future administrations unless there were early elections.

Lecornu persisted in his duties, engaging with all willing listeners. At the conclusion of his extension, he appeared on television to say he believed “a path still existed” to avoid elections. The president’s office announced the president would name a fresh premier two days later.

Macron kept his promise – and on that Friday reappointed Sébastien Lecornu. So recently – with Macron helpfully sniping from the sidelines that the nation's opposing groups were “fuelling division” and “entirely to blame for the turmoil” – was Lecornu’s moment of truth. Would he endure – and is he able to approve the crucial budget?

In a critical address, the 39-year-old PM outlined his financial plans, giving the Socialist party, who oppose Macron’s controversial pension changes, what they were waiting for: Macron’s key policy would be frozen until 2027.

With the conservative Les Républicains (LR) already on board, the Socialists said they would not back censorship votes proposed against Lecornu by the far right and radical left – meaning the administration would likely endure those ballots, scheduled for Thursday.

It is, nevertheless, far from guaranteed to be able to pass its planned €30bn budget squeeze: the PS clearly stated that it would be seeking more concessions. “This move,” said its head, Olivier Faure, “is just the start.”

A Cultural Shift

The problem is, the more Lecornu cedes to the centre-left, the more opposition he'll face from the right. And, like the PS, the conservatives are themselves divided over how to handle the new government – some are still itching to topple it.

A glance at the parliamentary arithmetic shows how tough Lecornu’s task – and future viability – will be. A combined 264 lawmakers from the far-right RN, radical-left LFI, Greens, Communists and UDR want him out.

To succeed, they need a majority of 288 votes in parliament – so if they can convince only 24 of the PS’s 69 deputies or the LR’s 47 (or both) to support their motion, Macron’s fifth precarious prime minister in two years is, like his predecessors, toast.

Most expect this to occur soon. Although, by an unlikely turn, the dysfunctional assembly musters collective will to pass a budget by year-end, the outlook afterward look grim.

So does an exit exist? Early elections would be unlikely to solve the problem: polls suggest nearly all parties except the RN would see reduced representation, but there would still be no clear majority. A fresh premier would confront identical numerical challenges.

Another possibility might be for Macron himself to resign. After a presidential vote, his successor would disband the assembly and hope to secure a parliamentary majority in the ensuing legislative vote. But this also remains unclear.

Surveys show the next occupant of the Elysée Palace will be Le Pen or Bardella. There is at least an odds-on chance that France’s voters, having chosen a far-right leader, might think twice about handing them control of parliament.

In the end, France may not escape its predicament until its politicians acknowledge the changed landscape, which is that clear majorities are a bygone phenomenon, winner-takes-all no longer applies, and compromise is not synonymous with failure.

Numerous observers believe that transformation will not be feasible under the country’s current constitution. “This isn't a standard political crisis, but a crise de régime” that will endure indefinitely.

“The system wasn't built to encourage – and actively discourages – the emergence of governing coalitions common in the rest of Europe. The Fifth Republic could be in its final stage.”